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The Politics of Implementation of the Judicial 
Council Model in Europe 
 
Abstract 
Currently, at least three approaches to judicial governance coexist in the European 
continent: the judicial council model, the courts service model and the Ministry of 
Justice model. Although doctrinal and case-specific literature abounds on this topic, 
examples of cross-country studies explaining choices on these models of judicial 
governance are rather scarce. More particularly, we lack so far knowledge on how 
different factors interact in leading to the implementation of the judicial council model. 
This is striking, given the importance of judicial councils for the operation of the rule of 
law. Furthermore, explanations on the choices of models of judicial governance are 
essential to understanding the intricate issue of the political rationalities underlying 
macro-level design of judicial institutions. Using qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) and focusing on European liberal democracies, this article contributes to 
literature in the field. It is shown that judicial councils are created when post-
authoritarian countries implement new constitutions either in Romanistic law countries 
or in countries subject to Europeanizing pressures. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The 20th century witnessed the emergence of an important, structural change in the way 
European countries had thus far understood the relationship between politics and the 
court system. Until that time, the governance of the judiciary had been mainly a 
responsibility of the executive and more particularly of the Ministry of Justice. 
However, at least since the end of the World War II, concerns about judicial 
independence, judicial accountability and a better judicial performance have started to 
alter this scenario (Guarnieri 2004; See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg 2009b: 57). 
Ministries of Justice have lost their monopoly on judicial governance, and in many 
countries, separate institutions with powers over the careers of judges or the 
management of the judiciary have been born (See Carlo Guarnieri 2007; Guarnieri 2004: 
174). Judicial governance no longer follows a single model. Instead, a diversity of 
approaches to judicial governance has emerged, enlarging the range of choices available 
to constitution makers and political actors. 
Judicial governance can be defined as the set of institutions, rules and practices in a 
jurisdiction that organize, facilitate and regulate the exercise by the judicial branch of its 
function of the application of law to concrete cases. From this perspective, judicial 
governance comprises a wide range of functions, from allocation of resources and the 
judicial budget to the oversight of the quality of the system and from the control of 
judicial careers to the allocation of cases to judges. 
Despite being central to the functioning of liberal systems based on the principles of 
rule of law and separation of powers, the topic of judicial governance has only recently 
started to gain prominence in law and social sciences literature (Denis Preshova et al. 
2017; Garoupa and Ginsburg 2015; Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014; Nuno Garoupa and 
Tom Ginsburg 2009a; Tin Bunjevac 2017; Win Voermans 2003). Most likely, for this reason, 
there is no universally accepted classification of existing approaches to the governance 
of the judicial branch. Different authors propose different typologies, and although these 
sometimes overlap, the differences between them are still important. A first typology of 
models of judicial governance is that provided by Win Voermans. In his 2003 piece, the 
author made a distinction EHWZHHQZKDWKHFDOOHG µ1RUWKHUQ(XURSHDQ¶DQG µ6RXWKHUQ
(XURSHDQ¶ MXGLFLDO Founcils. According to his work, the latter were characterized as 
EHLQJ µFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ URRWHG¶ DQG as fulfilling functions related to judicial 
independence, such as the appointment of judges, promotion or disciplinary measures 
(Win Voermans 2003: 2134). Conversely WKHIXQFWLRQVRIµ1RUWKHUQ(XURSHDQ¶FRXQFLOV
were focused on the management of the judicial organization, such as, inter alia, the 
management of caseloads, the budgeting of courts, quality care, to the exclusion of the 
management of judicial careers (Win Voermans 2003: 2135). A different classification 
was provided by Bobek and Kosar. In their work on judicial governance in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the authors point to at least five approaches to judicial governance, the 
Ministry of Justice Model, the judicial council model, the courts service model, hybrid 
models and the socialist model, although the latter has already disappeared from the 
European continent (Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014).  
With an aim to understand the rationales behind the implementation of the judicial 
council model in Europe, this article follows essentially the classification provided by 
Bobek and Kosar, as this is a clear taxonomy that differentiates models of judicial 
governance according to their most important characteristics: the organ of State with 
powers over the judiciary and the type of powers that such organs hold. Having the 
QRWLRQ RI µSRZHU¶ DW WKH FRUH RI WKH FODVVLILFDWLRQ the taxonomy provided by these 
authors is particularly useful for a political analysis of choices on models of judicial 
governance. However, certain variations to this classification and the scores of cases 
were introduced for this research (see Appendix 2). In this article, a judicial council is 
defined as a separate institution for judicial governance that has at least certain 
powers²even if limited²over the careers of judges. By this, I mean powers over 
appointment, promotion, discipline, separation from office, etc. These institutions, 
judicial councils, constitute the object of study of the paper. Besides them, we can 
classify the remaining forms of judicial governance in courts services and ministerial 
models. A courts service can be conceived as a separate institution that manages the 
judiciary and essentially lacks powers over judicial careers, its competences being 
mostly managerial. A Ministry of Justice model is defined as one in which the majority 
of powers, whether managerial or related to judicial careers, are concentrated in the 
Ministry of Justice. In addition, we can find a number of hybrid or sui generis models as 
well as authoritarian models of judicial governance in non-democratic countries. Based 
on this definition, this article contributes to the literature in the field with a classification 
of European systems of judicial governance (Table 1) in 29 liberal democracies of the 
continent.1 This classification is the basis for subsequent analyses carried out in the 
central part of this article.  
                                                          
1
 The 2018 Liberal Democracy Index of the V-Dem Project is followed to determine which countries are 
Table 1. Models of judicial governance in European liberal democracies 
Model Cases Number Share 
Judicial 
Council 
Strong 
Judicial 
Council 
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Italy, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain 
11 38% 
Weak 
Judicial 
Council 
Slovakia, Greece, Estonia 
Courts Service Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, 
Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden, UK* 
11 38% 
Ministry of Justice Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Germany 
4 14% 
Hybrid/Other Switzerland, Cyprus, Luxembourg 3 10% 
Total  29 100% 
* Includes the councils of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Own elaboration 
 
In Table 1 countries were classified into the afore-mentioned models of judicial 
governance.2 As can be seen, the judicial council model has been implemented in 38% 
                                                                                                                                                                          
liberal democracies (Coppedge et al. 2019).See methods section for further discussion on case selection. 
2 Some countries were difficult to classify, as their institutions for judicial governance were borderline, 
sui generis, or in between categories, but I have tried to minimize the number of hybrid cases in order to 
gain coverage in the analyses. Still, I admit that my classification, like any possible taxonomy, is based on 
per cent of countries covered. However, in analyzing the cases it was observed that 
although some countries had institutions for judicial governance with certain powers 
over judicial careers, the range of powers of these institutions was limited compared to 
RWKHUMXGLFLDOFRXQFLOV7RDFFRXQWIRUWKLVGLIIHUHQFHWKHVXEFDWHJRU\RIµZHDN¶MXGLFLDO
councils was created, comprising Slovakia, Greece and Estonia. These were borderline 
cases.  
7KHFRXUWV¶VHUYLFHPRGHOFRYHUVH[DFWO\WKHVDPHVKDUHRIFRXQWULHVEHLQJDOVRSUHVHQW
in 38 per cent of cases. Therefore, this model can be considered as a solid institutional 
alternative to the judicial council model. It is worth remarking that courts services are 
not always totally deprived from powers over judicial careers, although these are very 
limited compared to strong judicial councils (see Appendix 2).  
The third approach is the Ministry of Justice model. As it is present in only 14 percent 
of the cases, this model can be considered as residual. Hybrid models comprise 10 
percent of the cases.  
The landscape in European liberal democracies is therefore one of a wide diversity of 
approaches to the governance of the judicial branch. However, we know very little 
about the reasons that explain the implementation of these models of judicial 
governance. 7R WKHEHVW RI WKLV DXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJH WKHRQO\ DWWHPSW DW FRYHULQJ WKLV
topic is the excellent work by Garoupa and Ginsburg (2015). This scarcity of cross-
country causal research is striking, given the very relevant academic and socio-political 
implications of this question. First, it is essential to understand variation of modalities 
and sub-types of liberal systems of judicial governance. Second, it is central to the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
operationalization decisions that can be contested. It is for that reason that I decided to maximize 
transparency and show the classification in Table 1. I also provide for justifications about my scores in 
Appendix 2, which transparently discusses this issue indicating sources of information. 
understanding of rationalities, incentives and constraints underlying political choices of 
macro-level institutions. And third, it is fundamental to understand the overlap between 
legal, political and sociological phenomena in the design of legal institutions.  
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on this topic, empirically responding to 
the following question: how can we explain the diffusion of the judicial council model 
in European countries? To answer this research question, this article provides for a 
pioneering application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to the topic of 
choices on models of judicial governance. Using QCA, this article will provide for both 
cross-country patterns and case-specific explanations which together shed an important 
light over this scarcely researched object of study. 
As will be shown, the answer to the research question lies in combinations of four 
factors: legal families, authoritarian backgrounds, the role of constitutions in democratic 
transitions and Europeanization pressures. Together, these four conditions show the 
usefulness of explaining political-juridical institutions in their wider social milieu. As I 
will show, the four aforementioned factors interacted, resulting in choices on models of 
judicial governance by both creating incentives and inducing mindsets as to which 
arrangement was best to organize the judicial branch. In particular, it will be showed 
that the implementation of the judicial council model is the result of incentives created 
by authoritarian backgrounds in countries that implement new constitutions in their 
transition to democracy. But these authoritarian backgrounds only lead to the creation of 
judicial councils in Romanistic law countries -where these institutions found a more 
fertile ground for diffusion- or in countries subject to Europeanizing pressures ±as a 
signal of commitment to democracy and European integration, and expecting accession 
in return-.  
In this regard, the findings of the article differ from and complement those by Garoupa 
and Ginsburg  (2015). While these authors did not find evidence that the dichotomy 
civil law/common law countries had an impact in the implementation of judicial 
councils, this article finds evidence that focusing on a specific type of civil law family, 
the Romanistic one, has explanatory capacity. Additionally, in an earlier work Garoupa 
and Ginsburg (2009b) had suggested the existence of authoritarian backgrounds as one 
of the explanations for the implementation of judicial council. In their 2015 work, 
however, the authors focused instead in the impact of the level of democratic quality of 
countries. This article goes back to the idea of authoritarian backgrounds as the 
explanation of the implementation of judicial councils, at least in Europe, including it as 
part of the model. Finally, and most importantly, different from the work by Garoupa 
and Ginsburg (2015: 128 ff.), which focuses on the autonomous impact of independent 
variables on the dependent variable, in this article I will use QCA to try to 
systematically show how different explanations interact in leading to the 
implementation of these institutions. This is the most important element of the paper, 
one that structures its findings: while all of the conditions tested are important to 
explain the outcome, none of them is alone sufficient to produce it. Rather, it is their 
combination in specific manners what matters. This article will show in detail which 
were those combinations.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
framework of this article. The following section presents the methodological aspects. 
The subsequent sections carry out the configurational analyses of the data. Next, I 
analyse qualitatively two deviant cases: Poland and Czech Republic. After this, I 
discuss my findings in more detail. The last section concludes.  
 
II. Theory 
 
The choices of models of judicial governance are the result of the impact of legal, 
political and social factors that constrain and induce decision makers into opting for a 
certain model rather than another. In this section, it is argued that such factors are 
related to the type of legal family, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy (and, 
connected to this, the relevance of the enactment of new constitutions), and 
Europeanization pressures. The causal impact of these conditions can be explained by a 
combination of rational choice calculations and sociological factors in each case.  
 
a. Legal families 
 
The use of legal origins as an explanatory variable is controversial in the social 
sciences. For instance, the relation between legal origins and economic development 
ZDV UHFHQWO\ FRQWHVWHG LQ 'DP¶V LQIOXHQWLDO ZRUN (Dam 2006). The idea that legal 
families could have an impact on the diffusion of models of judicial governance has 
only been infrequently and indirectly addressed by the literature in the field (however see 
Daniela Piana, 2009, pp. 818±819). In fact, when this explanation has been systematically 
tested, no evidence of its explanatory impact has been found (Garoupa and Ginsburg 
2015: 133).  
Against this background, however, I believe that legal families can impact choices of 
models of judicial governance for two reasons. One of the reasons has to do with the 
pre-existing characteristics of legal systems and can be explained through rational 
choice theories. The other reason has to do with the processes of institutional imitation 
and diffusion, and it is better explained through sociological and ideational accounts.  
From a rational choice perspective, certain characteristics of legal families might be 
more compatible with certain elements of specific models of judicial governance, thus 
creating an incentive to implement such models. For instance, Garoupa and Ginsburg 
associate common law countries with a model of judicial governance focused on 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\UDWKHUWKDQLQGHSHQGHQFHµ5HFUXLWPHQWRIWKHMXGLFLDU\LQFRPPRQODZ
countries has traditionally drawn from more senior lawyers who have a wider range of 
previous experience and socialization than do judges in the civil law jurisdictions. 
Therefore, external accountability has been a major motivating factor in shaping the 
design of judicial appointment systems. Compared to the civil law judiciaries, common 
law judges have relatively few opportunities for advancement, and hence there is less 
capacity for political authorities to use the promise of higher office to influence judicial 
decision making. Accordingly, appointments processes have received serious attention 
since judges are fairly immune from pressures once appointeG¶ (Nuno Garoupa and Tom 
Ginsburg 2009a: 112). The authors also argue, although focusing on the US experience, 
WKDW µEHFDXVH LQ FRPPRQ ODZ V\VWHPV WKH MXGLFLDU\ LV QRW D ³FDUHHU MXGLFLDU\´ LQ WKH
civil law sense, there is less interest in having independent commissions handle 
discipline, promotions and reassignments, and greater emphasis on judicial 
DSSRLQWPHQWV¶ (Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg 2009a: 114). If judicial councils are 
created to take power over judicial careers out of the hands of politicians, then in 
common law countries, there is a weaker incentive to create such institutions because 
this problem is less pressing. 
The sociological element has to do with processes of institutional diffusion within legal 
families. (ONLQV DQG 6LPPRQV GHILQH GLIIXVLRQ DV µLQWHUGHSHQGHQW EXW XQFRRUGLQDWHG
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ¶LQZKLFKDFWRUVVXFKDVJRYHUQPHQWVPDNHDXWRQRPRXVGHFLVLRQVEXW
factor in the decisions of their peers on similar issues (Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons 
2005: 35). ,QWHUGHSHQGHQFH PHDQV KHUH WKDW µWKH DGRSWLRQ RI D SUDFWLFH E\ RQH DFWRU
alters the probabilLW\RILWVDGRSWLRQE\DQRWKHU¶(Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons 2005: 
36). In his review of diffusion theories, Ginsburg suggests that diffusion operates better 
between countries with similar characteristics and that one of those characteristics 
would be legal tradition (Tom Ginsburg 2008: 93). This logic can be conceived as one in 
which ideational factors guide the choices of models of judicial governance by 
increasing the likelihood of a model being implemented in a country when countries of 
the same legal family have already implemented it. In particular, it can be hypothesized 
that countries in each legal family will follow the model implemented in the most 
important countries with that legal tradition: the French and Italian judicial council 
model in Romanistic countries, the German Ministry of Justice model in Germanistic 
countries, and the Swedish and British courts service/administration models in the 
Scandinavian law and common law legal families. 
 
b. Authoritarian legacies and the enactment of new constitutions 
 
The general political background of a country seems to matter for the adoption of 
organs for judicial governance. In their work, Garoupa and Ginsburg (2015: 132) found 
evidence about the relevance of the level of democracy of a country to explain the 
adoption of judicial councils. This article tests the impact of related but different 
explanatory conditions: the existence of authoritarian backgrounds and of new 
constitutions in countries exiting authoritarianisms. 
Literature in the field has suggested that judicial councils were selected as a mechanism 
for judicial governance in countries that had a strong tradition of executive interference 
in the court system, while countries that had a more established tradition of judicial 
independence opted for the courts service model (Tin Bunjevac 2017: 822±823). Of 
course, one of the strongest modalities of such executive interference has to do with the 
existence of an authoritarian regime. According to GaruoSD DQG *LQVEXUJ µWKH
motivating concern for adoption of councils in the French-Italian tradition was ensuring 
independence of the judiciary afteU SHULRGV RI XQGHPRFUDWLF UXOH¶ (Nuno Garoupa and 
Tom Ginsburg 2009b: 58).  
Again, the connection between authoritarian legacies and the judicial council model can 
be explained from two perspectives. The first explanation is that the implementation of 
judicial councils is rational for the new democratic political elites in the processes of a 
transition to democracy. The new democratic political elites depend on the 
consolidation of democracy for their survival, and this depends in turn on the existence 
of strong constraints on power and an independent judiciary. The second explanation is 
ideational. Once a number of countries have successfully transitioned to democracy and 
implemented judicial councils in that transition process, other new democracies will 
deem this arrangement as appropriate to facilitate the consolidation of the new system 
of government. The logic here would be similar to that of diffusion explained above, but 
instead of operating within legal families, it would follow a logic of imitation among 
new democracies. Magalhães et al. explain the adoption of judicial councils in Southern 
European countries as a reaction against the existing authoritarian background:  
 
µLQ HDFK RI WKHVH FRXQWULHV D EURDG FRQVHQVXV ZDV SRVVLEOH
DURXQGDIHZPDMRULVVXHV«7KHILUVWZDVWKHWUDQVIHURf all or 
most supervisory powers over the judiciary from the executive to 
UHYLWDOL]HG³MXGLFLDOFRXQFLOV´7KHVHZHUHQRZFRQFHLYHGDVVHOI-
governing bodies of the judiciary that would absorb those 
executive powers that had been previously used to neutralize 
judicial independence: recruitment, appointment, disciplinary 
VDQFWLRQVSURPRWLRQVDQGWUDQVIHUV«$OOIRXUFRQVWLWXWLRQV>RI
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain]  included articles stating the 
independence of the judiciary from elected branches and assuring 
judicial life tenure, as well as banning special tribunals and 
unifying previously fragmented jurisdictional systems, a measure 
specially addressed at avoiding the repetition of past 
H[SHULHQFHV«¶ (Magalhães et al. 2006: 146±147). 
 
If the transition to democracy is associated with the implementation of a judicial 
council, then, sensu contrario, a lack of authoritarian experiences would mean a lack of 
incentives to implement such arrangement. But of course, post-authoritarian adoption of 
judicial councils depends in turn on an additional crucial factor: the enactment of new 
constitutions for the post-authoritarian period. It is the enactment of this new 
constitution that will create the window of opportunity for the implementation of the 
new model of judicial governance. Conversely, countries returning to old constitutions 
in the post-authoritarian period will not implement this arrangement.  
 
c. Europeanization 
 
In his influential work on Europeanization, Olsen distinguished five meanings of this 
popular term. One of them, the most relevant to the topic of choices of models of 
judicial governance, defined Europeanization as the µFHQWUDO SHQHWUDWLRQ RI QDWLRQDO
V\VWHPVRIJRYHUQDQFH«>ZKLFK@LPSOLHVDGDSWLQJQDWLRQDODQGVXE-national systems 
of governance to a European political centre and European-ZLGHQRUPV¶(Johan P. Olsen 
2002: 923±924). In this sense, Europeanization would be a top-down process in which 
policies designed at the European level are implemented in Member States. Bulmer 
explains that a top-GRZQ (XURSHDQL]DWLRQ RSHUDWHV ZKHQ WKHUH LV µD ³PLVILW´ DW WKH
GRPHVWLF OHYHO ZLWK (8 UHTXLUHPHQWV « >VR WKat] adjustment prHVVXUH EXLOGV XS¶ DW
such level (Simon Bulmer 2006: 51). The subsequent national adaptation to EU norms 
could be explained from two perspectives. From the perspective of rational choice 
institutionalism, adaptation would depend on the existence of national veto points and 
facilitating factors, while from a more sociological perspective, adaptation is explained 
E\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIµQRUPHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶VHHNLQJWRSHUVXDGHQDtional actors to change 
their preferences in processes of social learning (Simon Bulmer 2006: 51±52). 
Judicial governance became a major object of Europeanization when, from the 1990s, 
the European Union and the Council of Europe started to pay attention to judicial 
administration (Daniela Piana 2009: 816; Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014: 1260). There 
are many milestones in the emergence of the judicial council model as a soft standard in 
(XURSH$FFRUGLQJWR3UHVKRYDHWDOµGue WRWKHOLPLWHG³KDUG´DFTXis on the judiciary 
in general and different legal traditions, the EU relies on so-called European standards 
sponsored by CoXQFLO RI (XURSHDQ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ (Denis Preshova et al. 2017: 13). Since 
1993, when the EU established the Copenhagen criteria for accession, both this 
organization and the Council of Europe started to devote efforts to the creation of 
standards of court administration (Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014: 1260). In 1994, for 
instance, the Council of Europe made recommendations in line with the creation of 
judicial councils as a means of guaranteeing judicial independence (Garoupa and 
Ginsburg 2015: 128; Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg 2009a: 109). In the Agenda 2000, the 
Commission announced that it would report to the Council on the progress made by 
candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including the monitoring 
of independence and self-government of the judiciary (Michal Bobek and David Kosar 
2014: 1275±1276). 
In the case of the European Union, Preshova et al. underline two reasons why this 
organization put so much emphasis on judicial reform: first, because of its central 
importance to the operation of the rule of law and democratization in candidate 
FRXQWULHV DQG VHFRQG EHFDXVH RI WKH µ(XURSHDQ PDQGDWH¶ for national courts with 
respect to accession, which places national courts in charge of applying EU law to 
particular cases (Denis Preshova et al. 2017: 7). The implementation of judicial councils as 
a result of the dynamics of Europeanization could be deemed to be the result of a 
misalignment between the institutions existing at the national level and the standard for 
judicial governance promoted at the supranational level. In this context, it would be 
rational for national actors to implement judicial councils, as the prospects of EU 
membership would create a strong incentive to do so. Piana also refers to the impact of 
(XURSHDQL]DWLRQDOWKRXJKVKHRIIHUVDPRUHVRFLRORJLFDODFFRXQWµ7KH&RPPLVVLRQGLG
not dispose of any legal mechanism to oblige the candidate to adopt a specific 
organization model. In this policy field, there are no legally binding norms to be 
transmitted. The promotion of judicial independence and of judicial capacity has 
therefore to be relied upon the terms of a transnational discourse elaborated within 
epistemic communities and policy networks. This discourse is the outcome of policies 
DLPLQJ WR SURPRWH WKH ³UXOH RI ODZ´ DQG VFUHHQLQJ XVHG E\ WKLQN WDQNV DQG WKH
international organizations in the pHULRGRIGHPRFUDWLF WUDQVLWLRQ¶  (Daniela Piana 2009: 
823).  
 
d. Configurational hypotheses 
 
Thus far, based on existing literature in the field, I have explained why factors such as 
the type of legal family, democratic transitions with new constitutions and 
Europeanizing pressures should lead to the adoption of certain models of judicial 
governance, especially the judicial council model. However, these factors do not operate 
independently from each other. On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that 
they interact, giving rise to causal configurations that help to explain the outcomes of 
each case. For this reason, in this subsection, I will present some configurational 
hypotheses: hypotheses regarding how conditions should interact in order to be 
sufficient for the implementation of a certain model of judicial governance. For reasons 
of space, rather than presenting expectations for every possible configuration of the 
explanatory conditions, I will present only those that are the most theoretically sound. 
These configurational hypotheses are tested in the empirical part of this article. 
A first configurational hypothesis has to do with the interaction between authoritarian 
backgrounds and legal families. Above, I explained that the existence of a Romanistic 
civil law legal system is expected to be associated with the implementation of this 
approach to judicial governance. However, judicial governance in Romanistic civil law 
countries was, like all others, historically dominated by the Ministry of Justice. There 
must be, therefore, a historical event that changes political preferences, creating an 
incentive to brake with the path-dependent survival of the Ministry of Justice model and 
to create a new institution for judicial governance. Such events are the processes of a 
transition to democracy, especially when a new constitution is created. It is this 
combination of factors rather than each of them separately that is sufficient to explain 
the implementation of a judicial council in a country. The explanation is that in the 
Romanistic area judicial councils became the standard option in processes of transition 
to democracy, as the institution is compatible with this legal family and as cases such as 
Italy and France set a model to be followed by other countries sharing similar 
characteristics and background. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1. The combination of a Romanistic legal family AND a process of transition to 
democracy AND the enactment of a new constitution is sufficient to produce the 
implementation of a judicial council. 
  
A second configurational hypothesis would however suggest that there is an alternative 
route to the implementation of the judicial council model. A corollary of hypothesis 1 
would be that countries that exit authoritarian regimes might not opt for a judicial 
council when they do not belong to the Romanistic legal family. The reason is that, 
outside of this family, the dynamics of post-authoritarian imitation and institutional 
diffusion will not take place. However, when these non-Romanistic countries aim at 
joining the European Union a new, additional incentive is created. In a period in which 
the judicial council model has already become a soft standard in Europe, post-
authoritarian countries willing to join the EU will opt for this arrangement when 
enacting a new constitution, regardless of their legal family. With this option for a 
judicial council, these countries will be signaling EU partners their willingness to 
consolidate democracy and to join this supranational organization. For that reason: 
  
H2. The combination of a europeanizing pressures AND a process of transition to 
democracy AND the enactment of a new constitution is sufficient to produce the 
implementation of a judicial council 
 
III. Methodology 
 
The main methodology employed by this article is qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA). Although the basic aspects of this methodology will be explained in this 
section, readers unfamiliar with QCA and who are willing to learn more can find 
detailed explanations about it in the different specialized books that have been published 
in recent years (Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin 2009; Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius 
Wagemann 2012). To carry out the QCA, I used the fsQCA software. The crips sets 
version of QCA was used, as the conditions were dichotomous in nature. 
QCA of sufficient conditions seeks to identify which combinations of conditions suffice 
for the production of an outcome. To do so, and in order to attain parsimony, QCA uses 
a Truth Table, which presents all possible configurations of explanatory conditions. It 
also uses Boolean minimization, by which conditions that are logically irrelevant for the 
production of a result are dropped from the solution. QCA is also able to include 
counterfactuals in the minimization process, that is, configurations of conditions that did 
not empirically occur. QCA solutions are defined as follows: solutions that do not 
LQFOXGH DQ\ FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV DUH FDOOHG µFRPSOH[ VROXWLRQV¶, solutions that include all 
FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV DUH FDOOHG µSDUVLPRQLRXV VROXWLRQV¶, and solutions that only include 
counterfactuals that are theoretically sound DUH FDOOHG µLQWHUPHGLDWH VROXWLRQV¶ 7KH
traditional consensus among QCA methodologists has been that intermediate solutions 
were to be preferred (Ragin 2009: 111). For that reason, this article presents intermediate 
solutions only.  
To test the research hypotheses all countries included in Table 1, except for hybrid 
cases, are included in the analysis. Hybrid cases were excluded following a conservative 
strategy: since it was difficult to assign them to a particular model of judicial 
governance, they were excluded in order to increase the reliability of the analysis for the 
cases included. Additionally, the readers will notice that some European countries are 
not included in Table 1. The reason is that they were not part of the sample. In QCA, 
FDVH VHOHFWLRQ LV EDVHG RQ µDQ DUHD RI KRPRJHQHLW\¶ LQ ZKLFK FDVHV VKDUH µHQRXJK
EDFNJURXQGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶DVWRPDNHWKHPFRPSDUDEOH(Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 
2019: 20). The definition of this area of homogeneity, in this article, includes all 
European liberal democracies to the exclusion of micro-states. The 2018 Liberal 
Democracy Index by the V-Dem Project is followed to determine which countries 
classify as liberal democracies (Coppedge et al. 2019): countries scoring 0.5 or more in 
this index are included in the sample. Note that according to this operationalization 
Poland is included in the sample (V-Dem Score: 0.55), despite that different authors 
have documented the process of illiberalization and rule of law backsliding in this 
country (most notably Sadurski 2019). This has analytical implications, to the point that 
Poland will be the object of a specific analysis later in this paper. Countries that are not 
liberal democracies and micro-states are thus excluded, as given their characteristics 
judicial governance is deemed to follow in them different dynamics, not comparable to 
the sample of this article. Small states of the European Union, such as Cyprus, 
Luxembourg and Malta, are however included. The final sample comprises 26 
countries. )LQDOO\QRWHWKDW4&$RSHUDWHVRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIµPRGHVWJHQHUDOL]DWLRQ¶
(Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009: 11±12), so that researchers should be careful in 
generalizing the findings of the article beyond the sample countries included and, 
especially, to countries explicitly excluded because of their heterogeneity of background 
characteristics. 
For the outcome (the model of judicial governance in each country), my classification is 
similar but not identical to that provided by Bobek and Kosar (2014). Table 1 shows the 
classification of countries, and Appendix 2 provides for a justification of all scores. As 
the definition of judicial councils focuses on the range of powers of the institution over 
the careers of judges, the Justice Scoreboard 2016 was particularly useful to complete 
the classification (European Commission and Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers 
2016). However, this source does not cover some of the countries analyzed, so an 
independent, qualitative research on some of the cases had to be carried out. When the 
Justice Scoreboard 2016 did not cover a particular case, I used as a first supplementary 
source Bobek and Kosar (2014). If in any instance my score is different from theirs I 
justify this in Appendix 2. Finally, in cases not covered by any of these two sources I 
carried out my own research and justify the score assigned in Appendix 2. 
Regarding legal families, in order to determine which countries belong in the 
Romanistic legal family, I used the dataset provided by La Porta et al (2008). Note that 
my focus here is in the distinction between Romanistic civil law countries and all 
others, contrary to Garoupa and Ginsburg (2015: 132±133) who focus on the general 
civil law/common law distinction. As will be shown in the empirical part of this article, 
this has important consequences for the findings of the research. For authoritarian 
backgrounds, I mainly follow the CSIC database on Transitional Justice and Memory in 
the EU (CSIC-IPP 2013), although I extended it to countries not originally covered by it 
and corrected it when necessary. The data on whether countries enacted new 
constitutions at the end of repressive regimes and about EU enlargement waves were 
gathered autonomously by the author. Table 2 specifies the operationalization of such 
data into the crips set conditions of the analysis. 
 
Table 2. Explanatory conditions and their values 
Condition Values 
Outcome 1. Judicial council 
0. All other 
Romanistic 
legal family 
1. Romanistic 
0. All other (Germanistic, Scandinavian, Common law) 
Authoritarian 
background 
1. Had an authoritarian regime 
0. Did not have an authoritarian regime 
Europeanizing 
pressures 
1. Member state from the eastern enlargement or currently with 
a candidate status 
0. All other 
Old 
constitution 
1. Returned to an older constitution in the transition from 
authoritarianism  to democracy 
0. Did not have authoritarian regime or created a new 
constitution after authoritarian regime 
 
Following the best practices in the use of QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), the 
Truth Table (Table 3) and the data matrix (Appendix 1) are provided. Regarding the 
solution, the article only presents the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 
³judicial cRXQFLO´ (Table 4), which is the object of study of the research. No analysis for 
the negation of the outcome is displayed, for a substantive reason: the negation of the 
outcome groups together very different models (courts services and Ministry of Justice 
models). An analysis of sufficient conditions for the negation of the outcome would be 
analytically incoherent, grouping together cases that do not belong in the same category. 
Finally, the analysis of sufficient conditions in Table 4 includes indicators of coverage 
and consistency. Coverage indicates the proportion of cases with the outcome under 
study (in this case, a judicial council) that are explained by a path or a solution, while 
consistency explains the share of cases in a certain path or solution that have the 
outcome under study (See for further explanation Schneider and Wagemann 2013: 123±
139). 
 
 
IV. The dissemination of the Judicial Council model. Configurational 
analysis of sufficient conditions 
 
In order to understand choices behind the adoption of the judicial council model in 
European liberal democracies, this section performs an analysis of sufficient conditions, 
showing the intermediate solution.  
 
 
Table 3. Truth Table 
Roman Europ Authorit Old 
const 
Number Cases Raw 
consistency 
1 0 1 0 5 France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain 
1 
1 1 1 0 1 Lithuania 1 
0 1 1 0 7 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
0.714 
0 0 0 0 5 Finland, Iceland, Ireland, 
Sweeden, UK 
0 
0 0 1 1 3 Austria, Denmark, Norway 0 
1 0 1 1 2 Belgium, the Netherlands 0 
1 1 0 0 1 Malta 0 
0 0 1 0 1 Germany 0 
0 1 1 1 1 Latvia 0 
1 0 0 0 0   
0 1 0 0 0   
0 0 0 1 0   
1 0 0 1 0   
0 1 0 1 0   
1 1 0 1 0   
1 1 1 1 0   
 
In constructing the Truth Table (see Table 3), a contradictory row was found. The 
deviant cases (underlined in the table) were those of Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Contradictory configurations often point at the need to find out additional explanations 
that can resolve the contradiction. In order to maximize the coverage of the analysis and 
so that all countries with a judicial council are explained, the contradictory row was 
included in the minimization. But the deviant cases are indicated and explained 
autonomously, and a specific section of this article provides for a qualitative analysis of 
them accounting for the causes of this contradiction. 
Additionally, in the Truth Table (Table 3) there are some configurations without 
empirical cases. These are the counterfactuals that were referred to in the 
methodological section of this article. QCA is able to deal with counterfactuals in a 
sophisticated manner: including them in the minimization when there are reasonable 
theoretical JURXQGV WR GR VR 7KLV µLQWHUPHGLDWH VROXWLRQ¶ allows for an informed, 
transparent use of counterfactuals. The selection of directional expectations is made 
explicit in this section, following the recommendation of transparency as a good 
practice in the use of QCA (See Schneider and Wagemann 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Intermediate solution for judicial councils 
Path Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency Cases 
AUTHORITARIAN* 
old_const* 
ROMANISTIC 
0.545 0.454 1 France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Spain,  
AUTHORITARIAN* 
old_const* 
EUROPEANIZING 
0.545 0.454 0.75 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech R., 
Estonia,  Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
Solution coverage: 1 
Solution consistency: 0.846 
 
In order to produce the intermediate solution for the adoption of judicial councils (Table 
4), directional expectations had to be specified. Authoritarian backgrounds, 
Europeanizing pressures and Romanistic legal family were expected to contribute to the 
outcome when present. The survival of an old constitution was expected to contribute to 
the outcome when absent. The model achieved had perfect coverage, meaning that all 
countries with a judicial council can be explained by this solution. The consistency  of 
the model is 0.846, meaning that almost 85 per cent of the cases explained by the model 
were countries with a judicial council, thus accounting for and acknowledging the 
existence of contradictory cases.  
In the first path, which covers almost 55 percent of the cases, we observe that belonging 
to the Romanistic civil law tradition combined with having adopted a new constitution 
in the transition from a dictatorship to democracy is sufficient for the creation of a 
judicial council. In this regard, this path largely confirms the intuitions of the first 
research hypothesis (H1). The path includes the first councils in Europe, namely, the 
French (1946) and the Italian (1958) ones. For Garoupa and Ginsburg, the creation of 
these two councils had to do with a concern about the excessive politicization of the 
judiciary, which as a consequence, resulted in the granting of extensive independence to 
the judicial powers (Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg 2009a: 107). Once these two 
institutions were created, the template provided by France and Italy was followed by 
other countries that shared a similar legal culture and, especially, that were in their area 
of influence. Moreover, this template was followed exclusively when a critical juncture 
took place: a process of transition from dictatorship to democracy in which a new 
constitution was enacted. In the contexts of Romanistic law countries exiting 
authoritarian experiences, the creation of a judicial council was deemed as an optimal 
solution for consolidating the separation of powers and for ensuring the creation of an 
independent judiciary. Countries in the Romanistic area that did not undergo this type of 
process of transition to democracy or that did not implement a new constitution during 
such a transition did not implement a judicial council. Thus, this path very well fits the 
assessment by Garoupa and Ginsburg presented above, according to which the rationale 
for the adoption of judicial councils was ensuring the independence of the judiciary 
after undemocratic periods (Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg 2009a: 110). Despite that in 
a subsequent work the authors did not find a correlation between (common law) legal 
families and the adoption of judicial councils (Garoupa and Ginsburg 2015: 132), this 
article provides for evidence that, in Europe, the presence of a Romanistic legal family 
has explanatory impact. The path also fits the assertion by Guarnieri, according to 
ZKLFK WKH ,WDOLDQ PRGHO EHFDPH µD PRGHO IRU 6SDLQ DQG 3RUWXJDO LQ WKHLU SRVW-
DXWKRULWDULDQSHULRGV¶ (Guarnieri 2004: 178). 
The second path shows the importance of the dynamics of Europeanization for the 
adoption of the Judicial Council model. The explanatory capacity of Europeanization 
and the pressure by European institutions had been advanced by some authors (Garoupa 
and Ginsburg 2015: 128; Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014). This path provides for 
systematic evidence in support of the theory and explains in detail how it operates. In 
this path, the type of legal family is irrelevant. Instead, having joined the Union as part 
of the 2004 and subsequent enlargements becomes crucial for the adoption of a judicial 
council. This condition suggests that countries that join the European Union after the 
point in time when the judicial council model has already been consolidated as a soft 
standard in the continent feel strongly compelled to adopt this institution. As stated by 
%REHNDQG.RVDUWKH-XGLFLDO&RXQFLOPRGHOµKDVEHHQH[SRUWHGWKURXJKWKH(XURSHDQ
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGPDUNHWHGDVWKH³(XUR-VROXWLRQ´IRUWKHMXGLFLDOUHIRUPDFURVVWKH&((¶ 
(Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014: 1274). Preshova et al. are bold in their interpretation 
of the impact of the waves of accession on the adoption of the Judicial Council model: 
µ:KLOH MXGLFLDO UHIRUPV ZHUH QRW VHHQ DV D YHU\ LPSRUWDQW LVVXH IRU WKH VR-called old 
Member States, they have become a centre of interest with the EU accession of the 
Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs), and now even more so for the Western 
Balkan countries aspiring to become members RIWKH(8¶ (Denis Preshova et al. 2017: 7). 
However, the impact of Europeanizing pressures took place in connection with two 
other conditions: first, the transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime and, in 
that context, the corresponding implementation of a new constitution. The path, thus, 
confirms the intuitions of the second hypothesis (H2), suggesting that countries in 
transition to democracy implemented this model of judicial governance because of the 
incentive provided by European Union membership. 
 
V. The deviant cases 
 
a. The unexpected survival of the Ministry of Justice model in the 
Czech Republic 
 
In constructing the Truth Table (Table 3) it was observed that a row was contradictory 
and included two deviant cases. One of such deviant cases was that of the Czech 
Republic, which, unlike other cases in similar circumstances, did not implement a 
judicial council and followed the Ministry of Justice model. An in-depth analysis of the 
case revealed the reason for this striking phenomenon. The Czech case has been called 
µWKH ³EODFN VKHHS´ RI WKH UHJLRQ¶ DQG DQ µRXWOLHU FDVH¶ DV LW GLG QRW UHVXOW in the 
implementation of a judicial council, although interestingly it has also been praised as a 
case of success in achieving a high level of independence 'DYLG.RVDĜ. 
The reason why a judicial council was not created in this country was simply that 
despite attempts to implement this system, the Czech parliament rejected it. A number 
of arguments have been put forward to explain this rejection, including the fear of 
judicial corporatism and elitism, the need to amend the Czech constitution, the lack of 
support for the Minister of Justice at the time, and the lack of agreement on this model 
among the very judges .RVDĜ±184). 
One additional, interesting element in the case of the Czech Republic is that, once failed 
the attempt to implement a judicial council, the country opted for the Ministry of Justice 
mode. The statements by Bobek and Kosar are telling as to why µRQH PD\ HYHQ DVN
why the CEE countries, most of which were heavily influenced by the German and 
Austrian legal tradition, were asked to opt for the Italian model of court administration. 
Had the choice been phrased as either the German/Austrian model or the Italian model 
LQVWHDGRI HLWKHU WKH*HUPDQ$XVWULDQPRGHORU WKH ³(XURSHDQ´PRGHO WKH DQVZHURI
&(( FRXQWULHV ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ GLIIHUHQW¶ (Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014: 1282). 
The case of the Czech Republic seems to confirm this intuition. The weight of the 
germanistic legal family in this country might explain why once the judicial council 
model failed, the Czech Republic persevered in maintaining the Ministry of Justice 
model, following the example of Germany and Austria. The Czech model evolved over 
the years into a system in which the Ministry of Justice shares responsibility with the 
FRXUWV¶ presidents  (Michal Bobek and David Kosar 2014: 1288). According to Kosar, 
µ&]HFKcourt presidents have managed, step-by-VWHS WRHURGH WKH0LQLVWHU¶VVSKHUHRI
influence and have themselves become the most powerful players in the Czech 
MXGLFLDU\ DEOH WR ZLHOG WKH PRVW HIIHFWLYH ³VWLFN´ GLVFLSOLQDU\ PRWLRQ DQG ³FDUURW´
(promotion) against individual judges. The Czech court presidents are thus both 
SURWHFWRUVRIMXGLFLDOLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DWKUHDWWRLW¶ 'DYLG.RVDĜ
97).  
 
b. A very sui generis approach to the courts service model in Poland  
 
Another interesting finding has to do with Poland. Although the 2018 V-Dem Liberal 
Democracy Index gives this country a score of 0.55, there is an emerging consensus in 
the literature that Poland has undergone a process of rule of law backsliding %XJDULþ
and Ginsburg 2016; PECH and SCHEPPELE 2017; Sadurski 2019). It is thus not 
surprising that the Polish case is contradictory: following in-depth analyses such as 
those provided by Sadurski (2018; 2019) it is very much questionable that Poland still 
belongs in the family of EuURSHDQ OLEHUDO FRXQWULHV DQG WKXV LQ WKH ³DUHD RI
KRPRJHQHLW\´RIWKLVDUWLFOH,QDQ\FDVHPoland was a deviant case in a path in which 
judicial councils were predominant. Why did Poland opt for an institution for judicial 
governance without substantive powers over the careers of judges?  
The answer to this lies precisely in its process of rule of law backsliding. Poland 
underwent Europeanizing pressures at the exit of its authoritarian regime, so the judicial 
council model should have been the default option. But the process of rule of law 
backsliding might have pushed the country away from this model, and towards the 
adoption of an institution which is more amenable to executive control %XJDULþ DQG
Ginsburg 2016; Sadurski 2018). In this context, the implementation of a pseudo-courts 
service model can be a good excuse to strip the independent organ for judicial 
governance of its powers. The case of Poland is thus exceptional. The country can no 
longer be said to have a proper judicial council. But it would be optimistic to consider 
the institution for judicial governance of this country as simply an equivalent of the 
liberal version of the courts service model. Instead, Poland can be simply deemed to 
have a disempowered organ for judicial governance that is the result of the specific 
political context of this country and its process of rule of law backsliding and 
illiberalization. 
 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
The aim of this article was to explain the implementation of the judicial council model 
in European liberal countries, and to do so through the exploration of four main factors: 
legal families, authoritarian backgrounds, constitutions in democratic transitions and 
Europeanizing pressures. Using QCA, this study has confirmed the explanatory capacity 
of these four conditions, showing evidence in favor of the two configurational 
hypotheses presented above.  
With these findings, I hope to have contributed to shedding light on an important aspect 
of the design of an under-explored legal-political institution. More particularly, 
contributing to the literature on political decision making, the article provides empirical 
knowledge regarding the rationales, incentives and constraints behind the choices of 
institutions made by political actors. Contributing to the literature on comparative legal 
and political institutions, the study also shows that options for implementing models of 
judicial governance are not the result of random or idiosyncratic factors but instead 
follow cross-country patterns. 
The findings of this article help us to refine the existing knowledge about models of 
judicial governance. They showed that the judicial council model was implemented in 
relation to a very important historical circumstance: the existence of authoritarian pasts. 
Judicial councils in the sample were always created against the background of an 
important historic trauma. In countries exiting authoritarianism, the priority seemed to 
be setting guarantees that the judiciary would remain independent once the new 
democracy was established in order to meet one of the basic requirements of a system 
based on the rule of law. In Romanistic law countries, the implementation of the 
councils after authoritarian experiences seemed to be an automatic response when new 
constitutions where enacted. We can talk in this case about processes of institutional 
diffusion and imitation within this legal family in response to a common historical 
trauma. However, as Bobek and Kosar suggest, for many other countries, the 
implementation of the Judicial Council model also had a lot to do with Europeanizing 
pressures, rather than being the result of unconstrained processes of institutional 
imitation.  
The findings of this paper also open some interesting lines of inquiry. First, as it was 
shown, the spread of the judicial council model has heavily relied on Europeanizing 
pressures. It remains to be seen what will happen in the absence of such pressures when 
either the prospect of accession to the European Union disappears for some candidate 
countries or when accession has already been achieved. In this latter regard, the 
examples of Poland and Hungary are telling.  
Second, close attention will have to be paid to the evolution of the courts service model. 
The expansion of this model LQ LWV µQDWXUDO¶ DUHD RI diffusion²common law and 
Scandinavian countries²is almost complete. However, a number of Romanistic (Malta, 
Belgium, the Netherlands) and Germanistic (Latvia) countries have also opted for this 
model. The question that emerges is whether the courts service model will be 
considered an option in Romano-Germanic countries in which the judicial council 
model is now solidly anchored, especially in those that implemented that model as a 
response to authoritarian experiences. In the case of a positive response, a big challenge 
will have to be addressed: how to articulate a transition to this model of judicial 
governance which does not translate into a deterioration of judicial independence and 
the systems of checks and balances.  
A third and final question has to do with the Ministry of Justice model. This model 
exists now in a tiny minority of countries. Three out of the four instances in which it 
exists are in Germanistic law countries. However, there are more Germanistic countries 
that have adopted the judicial council model than there are countries that have remained 
faithful to the Ministry of Justice model, so this latter model cannot even be said to 
represent the standard option in this legal tradition. The question is how long this model 
can survive in these circumstances, in an époque in which its basic features seem to be 
at odds with the approach to judicial independence that has become dominant in the 
European continent. 
 
Conclusion 
Judicial councils are a very important institutional innovation in liberal democracies. 
These institutions are expected to play an important role in guaranteeing the separation 
of powers, taking the competences over the management of judicial careers away from 
the hands of politicians. This article has showed the factors that explain the 
implementation of these institutions in European liberal democracies. Judicial councils 
were created when countries transiting from authoritarianism to democracy enacted new 
constitutions, in either Romanistic law countries or in countries subject to 
Europeanizing pressures.  
Judicial councils have both a political and a juridical dimension. The findings of the 
article are in line with this dual nature of these institutions, and show the importance of 
combining socio-political and socio-legal explanations in order to understand the 
rationales behind their implementation. 
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Appendix 1. QCA dataset for replication of analyses 
 
case JC Romanistic Europeanizing Authoritarian Old_const 
Austria 0 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 0 1 0 1 1 
Bulgaria 1 0 1 1 0 
Croatia 1 0 1 1 0 
Czech 
Republic 
0 0 1 1 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 1 1 
Estonia 1 0 1 1 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 
France 1 1 0 1 0 
Germany 0 0 0 1 0 
Greece 1 1 0 1 0 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 1 1 0 1 0 
Latvia 0 0 1 1 1 
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 0 
Malta 0 1 1 0 0 
Netherlands 0 1 0 1 1 
Norway 0 0 0 1 1 
Poland 0 0 1 1 0 
Portugal 1 1 0 1 0 
Slovakia 1 0 1 1 0 
Slovenia 1 0 1 1 0 
Spain 1 1 0 1 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 
Uk 0 0 0 0 0 
Appendix 2. Justification of assigned values for outcome 
 
Case Model Score Source Justification 
Austria MJ 0 Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Belgium CS 0 JS 2016 Only 2 competences out of 13 in JS2016. Only competence over careers is proposing candidates for 1st 
instance courts. For that reason, I do not follow Bobek and Kosar (2014) that classify this organ as a JC. 
Bulgaria JC 1 JS2016 11 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including appointing and promoting judges, and taking 
disciplinary decisions. 
Croatia JC 1 JS2016 6 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including appointing 1st instance judges, dismissing 1st instance 
judges, transferring judges, etc. 
Cyprus H - Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Czech 
Republic 
MJ 0 Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Denmark CS 0 JS2016 Only 4 competences out of 13 in JS2016. According to this source, no substantive competences over 
careers of judges. 
Estonia JC(w) 1 Official 
website 
This is a borderline case. In Estonia, the Council for Administration of Courts has mostly administrative 
powers over courts of first instance and courts of appeal. However, it has powers on the appointment 
to office and premature release of chairmen of courts, the determination of the internal rules of 
courts, the determination of the number of candidates for judicial office, the appointment to office of 
candidates for judicial office, the payment of special additional remuneration to judges (see 
https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/administration-courts/council-administration-courts ). For that reason, 
it has been classified as a weak instance of the Judicial Council model. Note that Bobek and Kosar 
(2014) classify it as hybrid. 
Finland MJ 0 Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
France JC 1 JS2016 8 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including proposing candidates for 1st instance judge, appointing 
1st instance judges, proposing dismissal of 1st instance judges, dismissing 1st instance judges, etc. 
Germany MJ 0 Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Greece JC(w) 1 European 
Network of 
Councils of 
the Judicary 
According to the ENCJ (https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/factsheets/greece_sjc_ccj.pdf ) the 
Supreme Judicial Councils issues decisions on   ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƐŝŐŶŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƉŽƐƚƐ ?ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƐ ?
detachments, and transfers to another branch of magistrates which will be effected by presidential 
ĚĞĐƌĞĞ ?. 
Iceland CS 0 Official 
website 
The newly created Dómstólasýsla has mostly administrative powers over the judiciary 
(https://www.domstolar.is ). Note that Bobek and Kosar (2014) classify it as hybrid. 
Ireland CS 0 JS2016 Only 3 competences out of 13 in JS2016. According to this source, no substantive competences over 
careers of judges. 
Italy JC 1 JS2016 10 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including proposing and appointing 1st instance judges, dismissing 
1st instance judges, etc. 
Latvia CS 0 JS2016 1 competence out of 13 in JS2016. Only competence over judicial careers is proposing dismissal of 1st 
instance judges. 
Lithuania JC 1 JS2016 9 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including appointing 1st instance judges, dismissing 1st instance 
judges, transferring judges, etc. 
Luxembourg H - Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Malta CS 0 JS2016 Only 3 competences out of 13 in JS2016. Only competences over judicial careers are proposing 
dismissal and dismissing 1st instance judges. 
Netherlands CS 0 JS2016 Only 4 competences out of 13 in JS2016. Only competences over careers are on judicial promotions. 
For this reason, in this instance I do not follow Bobek and Kosar (2014), as they classify this as a JC 
Norway CS 0 Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Poland CS 0 JS2016 Only 3 competences out of 13 in JS2016. Only competences over judicial careers are proposing 
candidates for appointment and proposing dismissal of 1st instance judges. For this reason, in this 
instance I do not follow Bobek and Kosar (2014), as they classify this as a JC 
Portugal JC 1 JS2016 9 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including appointment of 1st instance judges, dimissing 1st instance 
judges, transferring judges, etc. 
Slovakia JC(w) 1 JS2016 This is a borderline case. 4 competences out of 13 in JS2016, although these include proposing 
candidates for appointment as 1st instance judges, proposing dismissal of 1st instance judges and 
promoting a judge. Bobek and Kosar (2014) also classify it as a JC. 
Slovenia JC 1 JS2016 8 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including appointing 1st instance judges, dismissing 1st instance 
judges, transferring judges, etc. 
Spain JC 1 JS2016 8 competences out of 13 in JS2016, including proposing candidates to 1st instance judge, disciplinary 
decisions, promoting a judge, etc. 
Sweden CS 0 Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Switzerland H - Bobek and 
Kosar, 2014 
Not included in JS2016. I follow Bobek and Kosar, 2014. 
Uk CS 0 JS2016 There are actually 3 organs for judicial governance in the UK: one for England and Wales, one for 
Scotland and one for Northern Ireland. All of them are classified as Courts Service institutions, as none 
of them has more than 2 out of 13 competences in the JS2016. Note that Bobek and Kosar (2014) 
classify them as hybrid. 
Legend: JC: Judicial Council; JC(w): Judicial Council (weak); CS: Courts Service; MJ: Ministry of Justice; H: Hybrid; JS2016: Justice 
Scoreboard 2016 
